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Summary findings
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to create greater public awareness about the poor  groups in joint initiatives to improve services. Similar
performance of public service providers and to challenge  report cards have since been prepared on several other
them to be more efficient and responsive to their  large cities in India.
customers.  It is not easy to measure the impact of the report  card
The report card was the result of a survey of a sample  on the quality and responsiveness of Bangalore's service
of users (both rich and poor) of the city's services and  providers. Paul examines the problems involved and
rated public agencies in terms of public satisfaction with  gives some intermediate indicators.
different dimensions of their services. Public feedback  There  is some evidence that public awareness of the
was used to quantify the extent  of corruption and other  problems has increased as a result of the experiement.
indirect costs of the services. The result was a citizens'  Civil society institutions seem to be more active and their
assessment of public services.  interactions with public agencies have become better
The survey was completed in 1993, but the follow-up  organized, more purposeful, and continuous. As a result,
activities continued for three years, with the active  some public agencies in Bangalore have begun to take
involvement of several concerned citizen groups and  steps to improve their services.
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Executive  Summary
This paper narrates how a "report card" on public services in the Indian city
of Bangalore  was used by several civil society institutions both to create
greater public awareness about the poor performance  of their public service
providers and to challenge the latter to be more efficient and responsive  to
their custorners. The report card consisted of a sample survey of the users
of the city's  services (both rich and poor) and a rating of the public agencies
in terms of public satisfaction with different dimensions  of their services.
Public feedback was also used to quantify the extent of corruption and
other indirect costs of the services. The end result was an assessment  of
public services from the perspective of citizens.
The survey was completed in 1993, but the follow up activities continued
for the next three years, with the active involvement of several citizen
groups and non-governmental  bodies concerned about these issues. The
involvement of the media in disseminating  the findings of the report card,
the responses  of public agencies  to the report card and the joint initiatives
to improve services by the agencies  and citizen groups are among the
subjects discussed in this paper. Similar report cards have since been
prepared  on several other large cities in India.
The measurement  of the impact of the report card on changes in the quality
and responsiveness  of service providers is not an easy task. The paper
examines the problems involved and provides some data by way of
intermediate indicators. There is some evidence  that public awareness of
these problems has increased  as a result of the experiment. Civil society
institutions seem to be more active on this front and their interactions with
public agencies  have become better organized, purposive and continuous.
As a result, some public agencies in Bangalore  have begun to take steps to
improve their services. The paper concludes that public feedback ("voice")
in the form of a report card has the potential to challenge governments  and
their agencies  to become more efficient and responsive  to customers.
1Making  Voice Work: The Report  Card  on Bangalore's  Public  Services
Samuel  Paul
Can "organised  public feedback"  be used as a form of  voice to  demand
greater  public  accountability?  The  "report  card"  on  public  services  in
Bangalore was an experiment to answer this question. It  was  initiated by
this author with  the support of a small group of  other concerned citizens
who  felt that  collective action to improve services might  be facilitated by
this  intervention.  Field work  support  was  provided  by  a  local  market
research agency. Survey costs were met largely through the mobilization of
local  donations. Similar report card studies have since been prepared for
several other cities in India (Paul: 95; Paul and Sekhar: 98).
The primary objective of this civil society initiated "report  card"  project in
Bangalore  was  to  create  greater  public  awareness  about  the  poor
performance of the providers of essential services in the city  and through
this  process to  stimulate the  concerned public  agencies to  serve  their
customers  better.  As  an  independent, non-governmental endeavour, the
project had no power or influence over the service providers or the citizens
of  Bangalore. Its  organisers felt  that  if  the  report  card  findings  were
interesting, citizens would listen. Whether this would lead to citizen action
to  demand greater public accountability  or  provoke service  providers to
perform  better  was  difficult  to  predict.  Such  outcomes  depend  on  a
constellation of factors none of which was under the organisers' control. An
incisive report card on public services could,  at best, be a catalyst in the
process.
The report card on Bangalore's public services was prepared  in 1993. Urban
services were considered to be unsatisfactory by many people at this time.
Almost all essential services were the responsibility of the government and
were  managed and  regulated by  specified authorities  such  as  the  city
municipal corporation,  electricity  board, water  authority,  etc.  As  public
authorities,  they  operate  under  certain  political  and  administrative
constraints that do not apply to private enterprises  of similar size. The rapid
expansion  of  the  city  no  doubt  added  to  their  burden  without  a
corresponding expansion of their resources. But their poor performance and
relative lack of accountability could not by any means be attributed solely to
these  factors.  The  monopolistic  nature  of  their  operations,  inefficient
planning and management of public resources, lack of internal incentives to
perform, and public apathy to this state of affairs are other factors which
may also have contributed to the problems facing the city.
2Design  of the Report  Card
A  report card represents an assessment of the  public services of the city
from  the  perspective of  its  citizens. The  latter  are  the  users of  these
services and can provide authentic feedback on the quality, efficiency and
adequacy of the services and the problems they  face  in their  interactions
with  the  service  providers. They  may  not  be  able  to  comment  on  the
technical features and standards of the services or to  evaluate the overall
performance of a provider. But they are eminently qualified to say whether
the  service  meets their  needs, and  whether  the  agency  is  responsive,
corrupt,  reliable,  etc.  When  customers  rate  an  agency  on  different
dimensions of the service, it provides a basis for judging its performance as
a service provider. Since citizens are customers of several different services,
it  is possible to compare ratings of this kind across services. The resultant
pattern  of  ratings (based on  public satisfaction)  is then converted  into a
"report  card"  on the city's  services. A  report card permits the  ranking of
public agencies  both in terms of the overall public satisfaction with services
and of their specific dimensions  such as quality, corruption, etc. Since cities
have large populations, proper sampling procedures need to  be followed  in
order to derive statistically reliable ratings.
The  concept  of  the  report  card  and  client  surveys  are  new  to  most
governments and their agencies. But private firms operating in a competitive
environment make use of this approach in many countries. It  is in light of
the  information  gathered through  such  surveys  and  analysis that  they
redesign their products and services and improve staff training and delivery
modes. The  private sector  seeks customer feedback because it  provides
information and insights that  rates of  return and other financial measures
cannot offer.  A monopolist may survive and even earn a high rate of return
despite unsatisfactory services because  customers have no choice.
A Report  Card  on Bangalore
Bangalore  was a city of 4.5 million people in 1993, and a growing centre of
modern  industries  and  scientific  research.  Despite  its  emergence as  a
leading  centre  of  commerce  and  industry,  its  public  services  and
infrastructure suffer from the same problems and constraints as other large
urban centres in India. The basic civic services are provided by the city's
municipal corporation while services such as water, power, telecom, urban
planning, etc.,  are the responsibility of other  specialised public authorities
that  are outside the control of the municipal body. All these agencies are
managed at  senior  levels  by  staff  who  are  deputised  from  the  state
government and whose tenures on the job tend to be rather short.
3As noted above, the report card on Bangalore's public services was planned
by  this  author  who  subsequently founded the  Public Affairs  Centre,  an
independent organisation that  is dedicated to the  cause of  improving the
quality of governance in the country. The study was grounded in the belief
that  systematic  public  feedback  on  urban  services  might  act  as  the
&collective voice"  of the people and provide a basis for demanding greater
public accountability. A small advisory group of local leaders supported this
project. But neither the government nor any of its agencies  was associated
with  the initiative.  Field work  for  the study was carried out  by  Marketing
and  Business Associates (MBA) Ltd.,  a  leading market  research agency
based in Bangalore.
The  study  that  resulted  in  the  report  card  focused  on  the  following
questions: How satisfactory are the public services that matter most to the
citizens  of  Bangalore?  What  specific  aspects  of  their  working  are
satisfactory  or  unsatisfactory? What  are the  direct  and indirect  costs  of
these services to  their  users? Can the  information generated through the
survey be used to rate the performance  of service providers ?
A stratified  random sample survey was the  method adopted to  probe the
issues listed  above.  Focus  group  discussions and  mini  case studies  of
problems frorn different parts of the city  were undertaken at the outset in
order to  sharpen the issues for study and the questions to  be asked. The
city was stratified according to the age of the localities. Six areas were then
selected and within each area, sample households  that  had interacted with
at least one service provider in the  preceding six  months were  identified
using  random  numbers.  Separate samples  were  selected  from  among
general  (middle and  upper  income)  households and  poor  (low  income)
households. Responses  were obtained from 807  general households in the
city.  The  sample size  of  poor  households interviewed  was  327.  These
households were  also selected from  the  same localities from  which  the
general households  came. These sample sizes are large enough so that error
ranges  are  well  within  generally  accepted  statistical  norms.  Structured
questionnaires  were  administered  to  the  respondents  by  trained
investigators. (For further details, see Paul: 95).  Show cards were used to
help respondents specify the ratings of their satisfaction with a service.
The surveys were conducted separately for the general households (middle
and upper income people) and the slum households (low income people) in
the city. The services of interest to these two  groups are not identical. The
urban  poor  were  estimated  to  be  about  a  tenth  of  the  population  in
Bangalore. Since the problems faced by the poor were different from those
of the higher income groups, different questions were asked of the former
and the interview methods were adapted to their contexts. The rating scales
4used for the general households,  for example, were considered inappropriate
in the context of the low income and less literate households.
Major Findings
The  study  did  not  identify  a  predetermined set  of  public  agencies for
investigation. Instead, respondents were  asked to  focus on  the  agencies
with  which they  had interacted in connection with  a problem or  to  get a
service.  It  was  then  found  that  the  electricity  board,  the  water  and
sewerage board, the  municipal corporation,  telecom, public sector  banks
and hospitals and the city's  development authority were the agencies with
which citizens had the most interactions. The study also revealed that nearly
92 per cent of these transactions were made through personal visits by the
respondents. In two  thirds  of  the cases, they  had to  make two  or  more
visits to solve a problem. Even when some of them phoned or wrote to an
official,  this  had  invariably to  be  followed  up  with  visits  to  the  agency
office.  The  feedback  clearly  brought  out  the  time  consuming  and
cumbersome ways  in which  citizens had to  deal with  the  major service
providers of the city.
The use of a rating scale permitted the respondents  to quantify the extent of
their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the service of an agency. The scale
was used not  only  for  an overall assessment of  an  agency but  also for
different dimensions of its service. The end product of the scaling process is
a set of scores by respondents that could be used to rank and compare the
public's  rating  of  agency services. These scores signify  the  patterns  of
perceptions of the public about agency performance in a way that  isolated
complaints can never do.
The tables presented below summarise  the major findings of the report card.
The tables  under "general  households"  highlight  the  ratings and  related
information  pertaining  largely to  middle  class  people. The  tables  under
Aurban  poor"  refer to  the  ratings given  by  slum dwellers.  For the  latter
group, the  rating scale referred to  above was  not used. The satisfaction
scores for the urban poor look somewhat better for this reason.
5Table 1: Overall Satisfaction with Public Agencies ( General  Households)
Agency  Average  Percentage  Percentage
Rating  of users  of users
satisfied  dissatisfied
Telephones  3.6  9  28
Municipal Corporation  2.9  5  49
Electricity  3.5  6  31
Water  3.0  4  46
Health  4.3  25  19
Regional  Transport  3.5  1  36
Office
Development Authority  2.5  1  65
Public sector Banks  4.0  20  26
( A seven point rating scale was used in the survey. "Satisfied"  refers to
per cent satisfied {6} and very satisfied {7}.  "Dissatisfied"  refers to per cent
very dissatisfied {1} and dissatisfied {2}.)
While the avierage  ratings of the different agencies  tell us a great deal about
their  performance, the feedback summed up in the  next two  columns are
even more revealing. The Bangalore Development Authority  has only one
per cent  satisfied. It has 65  per cent dissatisfied customers. In general, if
the  goal is to  increase the  proportion of  its fully  satisfied  customers, the
public agencies in Bangalore  have a long way to go.





(average  for all
agencies)
Satisfaction with Behaviour  of  25
staff  (%)
Percentage  of those who made  25
three or more visits to the
agency
Problem resolution rate (%)  57
Some of the dimensions associated with satisfactory service are summarised
in Table 2. People  are concerned about the treatment they get in agency
offices. They would like to get their services or problems settled with the
least delay and cost. They would also expect to get a satisfactory resolution
of their problems. Bangalore's public agencies, taken together , are
perceived by their customers to have performed poorly on these counts.
More detailed evidence by agency of dimensions such as staff  behaviour,
quality and information is found in Table 3.
7Table 3: Key Dimensions  of Satisfaction By Agency (General  Households)
Agency / Dimension of Satisfaction  Percentage  of respondents
satisfied
Staff Behaviour
Bangalore  Development  Authority  11
Bangalore  City Corporation  31
Bangalore  VVater  supply and  26
Sewerage Board
Karnataka Electricity Board  18





Bangalore  Development  Authority  2
Bangalore  City Corporation  10
Bangalore  Water supply and  13
Sewerage Board
Karnataka  Electricity Board  19





Bangalore  Development  Authority  4
Bangalore  City Corporation  16
Bangalore  Water supply and  18
Sewerage Board
Karnataka Electricity Board  28




( "Satisfied" as defined in the note to Table 1)
8Table 4:  The Speed Money Phenomenon  ( General  Households)
Agency  Proportion  in Sample  Average
claiming  to having  Payment  per
paid  Transaction
(in  Rupees)
Karnataka Electricity  11  206
Board
Bangalore  Water Supply  12  275
and Sewerage  Board
Bangalore  City  21  656
Corporation  ___
Public Hospitals  17  396
Regional  Transport  33  648
Office
Telephones  4  110
Bangalore  Development  33  1850
Authority
Average  14  857
Note:  One US  dollar = Rs. 30
Speed money (Table 4)  refers to  the  bribes given and taken  in order to
ensure that  services are provided satisfactorily.  This  is  not  a  subject on
which all people are willing to speak openly or in an unbiased fashion. It is
not, however, easy to cross check the responses or to correct them for any
biases. The only safety here is in numbersl Our knowledge of the nature of
the services being provided by the different agencies can also be an indirect
check on the veracity  of  the data. Thus, it  seems logical that  the speed
money per transaction in the Development Authority  that  deals in property
and house sites is much higher than that estimated for the Electricity Board.
The Bangalore  Development Authority  has the highest proportion of people
paying speed money.
9Table 5:  Investment in Coping Mechanisms  (in Million Rs.) (General
Households)
Asset invested in  Bangalore
Underground water tanks  1500
Overhead  tanks  2335
Borewells  2685
Voltage stabilisers  500
Water filters  1750
Generators  *  500
Total investment  10,000
*  Estimated  to be in use by households
Note: Total  investment  also  includes  other  smaller  items not listed  above. ft
is  an  estimate  for  all  the  households  in  the  city.  The proportions of
households  owning these assets were estimated from the sample survey
and  current  average  prices  of these  assets  were obtained  from the market.
Table 5 provides some interesting estimates for Bangalore  city  of the costs
people incur in order to compensate for the unreliability and inadequacy of
certain public services. Thus, people build underground and overhead tanks
in order to  be sure that they  always have a reasonable supply of water  in
the home. It has been estimated that  the interest (at 15  per cent) on  the
total  unproductive investment reported in Table 5 amounts to  seven times
the property tax collection in Bangalore.
10Table 6:  KEY DIMENSIONS OF A GENCY RESPONSIVENESS
(Per cent of Urban Poor Agreeing with Statement)
Dimensions  Bangalore
Staff were helpful  40
Problem was attended to in time  38
Problem  was solved in reasonable  time  26
Three or more visits were made to  71
agency
Problem  was finally solved  38
Note: A weighted average of the figures for all agencies is used in each cell
throughout the table)
Table 6 shows results for the sample of  poor households. It  is significant
that the problem resolution rate for the poor is much lower than that  for the
general households. The proportion of the poor making three or more visits
to solve their problems is also substantially higher than that  of the general
households.
An analysis of these tables and other findings of the report card leads to the
following conclusions:
1. The levels of public satisfaction with the performance of service providers
in Bangalore  are uniformly low despite the marginally better ratings of some
agencies. Corruption is  widespread in  most  of  the  agencies and  has no
doubt  contributed to the severity of  public dissatisfaction. Corruption is a
problem for the city's  poor too,  with  a third  among them having to  pay a
bribe to get a service or to solve a service related problem. Costs in terms
of time and effort that  people incur are quite heavy. It is significant that  a
majority of the  respondents (54 per cent) are willing to  officially  pay more
for the services provided they are of reliable quality rather than pay under
the table with no assurance  of quality.
1 12. The underlying lack of accountability on the part of the public agencies  of
Bangalore is attributable to several factors:  the monopolistic nature of the
organisations  involved,  inadequate  supervision  and  lack  of  proper
management systems, the prevalence of non-transparent practices, and the
inability of citizens to access information and to undertake collective action
are some of  the  forces  at work.  While a  report card is  not designed to
provide a full  scale problem diagnosis, the underlying information can point
to the directions for further investigation.
3.  Bangalore's report  card challenges the  myth  that  public  services are
cheap. Official fees and user charges for services may be low,  but there are
"hidden"  costs that  users incur.  People are forced to  invest their  scarce
resources in order to  compensate for  the  unreliability and  inadequacy of
these services. Furthermore, they  may have no option  but  to  pay speed
money to  provider staff  in order to  obtain a service or to  solve a service
related problem.
4.  The  inter-agency comparisons with  respect to  public satisfaction  and
corruption  permitted by  a  report card can potentially be an aid to  create
public  awareness and  to  stimulate  agency  interest  in  addressing the
underlying problems. Quantification and rankings demand attention in a way
that  anecdotes do  not.  They  focus  attention  on  specific  agencies and
services that can be embarrassing to those in charge especially because of
the adverse publicity involved. How the report card was used in Bangalore
to  create public awareness and to  stimulate agency response is narrated
below.
II
Impact of the Report Card
The Bangalore  report card was the first  of its kind in India. There was no
precedent available  to us on the kinds of follow up actions to be taken upon
completion of  the  report  card.  The  exercise was  not  undertaken as  an
academic endeavour although  it  was  recognised that  its  methodological
implications and potential for  inter-city comparison could be of  interest to
the academic world too.  Our real interest, however, was in using the report
card as an aid to  improve service delivery  and the  accountability  of  the
city's  public  service  providers. But  to  achieve this  objective,  ways  and
means had to  be  invented to  elicit  positive  responses from  the  service
providers. The report card had little to say on how to invent them. It could
at best act as a trigger to stimulate both the public at large and the service
providers to  think  about and  create the  needed ways  and  means. In the
absence  of a structured path to achieve these objectives, it was decided to
start  with  the  dissemination of  the  findings  and  to  take  further  steps
12depending on the responses from the target groups. A  more proactive role
was  ruled out  by  the  author of  the  report card and the  organisation he
created simply because  of the limited resources  at their disposal.
Actions  Taken
The  dissemination  of  information  on  the  Bangalore  report  card  was
undertaken in three parts: First of all, the report was made available to the
heads of  all the  public agencies covered by the  study  and to  the  Chief
Minister  and  Chief Secretary of  Karnataka. Secondly, the  findings of  the
study  were  made known  to  the  press through  a  mini- seminar. Thirdly,
workshops  on  the  report  card  were  held  in  Bangalore specifically  for
dissemination  of  findings  to  interested  citizen  groups  and  other  non-
governmental organisations. This was  followed  up  by  similar meetings in
New Delhi and Mumbai.
The  responses from  agency heads and senior  government officials  were
polite, but lukewarm except for a few agencies. The Bangalore  Development
Authority (BDA), the worst rated city agency, responded with a request that
the author meet with  its senior officials for  a detailed discussion. A couple
of  other  agencies also wrote  to  say  that  they  would  like  to  put  these
findings to use. Some of the actions reported below were the result of the
follow up of these responses. But five out of the eight agencies  involved did
not evince any interest nor did they contradict the findings. The senior most
civil  servant in the  State noted  with  regret that  corruption  was  a wider
social problem the responsibility for which should not  be placed on public
officials alone.
In contrast,  the  response from  the  media was  lively  and  positive almost
without  an exception. All the major newspapers in Bangalore  publicised the
findings. Needless to say, agency specific findings and the  novelty of the
method used were in  part responsible for this  response. And,  of  course,
news about corruption always makes good copy! Interestingly, one of the
dailies, the Times of India, started a weekly feature with a graphic depiction
of one of the study findings at a time. This feature continued for about two
months, thus keeping the report card phenomenon  in public consciousness.
Seminars and meetings on the report card in Bangalore were attended by
local activists in civic affairs, representatives of residents' associations and
NGOs interested in the problems of the urban poor. Most participants were
familiar with the poor performance of the city's  public agencies, but did not
have the information necessary  to grade them or  pinpoint specific problem
areas. The report card gave them a handy tool to focus on issues of concern
and  stimulated them  to  think  about  remedial actions.  Perhaps the  most
important outcome was the public awareness created by the report card on
13the  need for  active citizen participation in order to improve the  quality of
civic services. At the time the report card was undertaken, very few active
residents' groups existed in Bangalore. Today there are over a hundred and
networking and  common activities among them are on the  increase. The
report card has thus created greater public awareness and some confidence
among citizens that  collective action and networking are both desirable and
feasible.
The Responses
As  noted above, there is no way  to predict the likely consequences of  a
report card of the kind discussed here. Nor is there any reason to  believe
that  any given sequence  of responses  or actions is inherently more effective
than any other. Responses  occur only when public agencies, citizen groups
or the media internalise the findings and feel motivated to act. Sometimes,
the  motivation  may exist,  but  the  resources required or  the  capacity  to
organise action  may  have  been lacking. We  present below  an  array  of
responses/actions that  followed  the  report  card,  but  were  not  in  any
significant way  orchestrated by  PAC. It  is difficult  to  say whether  all of
them contributed to improved accountability or service delivery on the part
of the public agencies  or to the control of corruption. Complex outcomes of
this  nature are  influenced by a variety  of factors.  The important issue is
whether  the  responses following  the  report  card  could  be  expected to
strengthen or support the forces that seek to achieve these outcomes.
The responses narrated below fall into the following four categories. First, a
number of other report cards were spawned, reflecting the interest of citizen
groups and other activists to use this device and generate more information
on services in order to highlight the problems or to  demand greater public
accountability.  Second,  public  agencies in  Bangalore began to  use this
approach to  improve their  understanding of  the problems facing  users of
services and  to  take  remedial action. Third,  citizen groups and  NGOs in
Bangalore initiated collaborative activities for  the  resolution of  the  issues
raised by the  report card. Fourth, the media began to  build on the report
card findings and probe them further for wider dissemination.
Replication  of Report Cards
The publication of the Bangalore report card and subsequent meetings on
this subject in other cities have led to the creation of similar report cards in
other cities. By now, report cards have been prepared  for Chennai (Madras),
Pune, Ahmedabad, Calcutta and Mumbai (Bombay). While these exercises
were undertaken under the auspices  of the Public Affairs Centre (PAC), local
NGOs collaborated with  PAC in these cities. There are also some cases of
14other groups in some cities doing report card projects on their own,  but with
technical advice from PAC. Thus, a report card on Baroda was prepared by
a civic group in that city. In Ahmedabad, a special report card was prepared
on  the services of  interest to  the  urban poor women.  In  Bangalore also,
more specialised report cards have been prepared at the initiative of  other
organisations as will be discussed below. Examples  are the report cards on
hospitals and  on  public transport.  The original experiment thus  led to  a
spate of similar studies for other cities and agencies and stimulated a variety
of citizen groups to make use of study findings in different contexts.
Service  Provider  Responses
The Bangalore  Development  Authority (BDA) was the first  public agency to
respond to the report card in a systematic fashion. Its commissioner asked
PAC to  assist in doing a report card on a few  of  its  layouts (both  middle
income and low income schemes)  in the hope that the results could be used
to motivate the BDA officials to be more responsive to the people. For the
first time in India, this survey enabled  a public agency also to seek feedback
from its customers on the issue of corruption. The new report card helped
BDA to identify the weak areas in its service planning and delivery systems.
The follow up actions taken by BDA provided a role for PAC to diagnose the
problems of the agency-customer interface. As of date, PAC's analysis and
advice have resulted in a series of training workshops for the BDA managers
and case workers  (who deal with  the public) and a study of the agency's
internal systems and practices. It  is likely that  new systems will  be put  in
place  that  will  not  only  make  BDA's  operations  more  efficient  and
responsive, but also more user friendly and transparent.
The  Bangalore  City  Corporation  (BCC) was  another  public  agency that
responded to  the  report card.  BCC is  a  much  larger and  more complex
organisation than BDA. It has a much wider range of services and a large
number of range and ward offices all over the city.  BCC's responses were
threefold.  First  of  all,  its  commissioner  (chief  executive)  initiated  a
programme to involve citizen groups and NGOs in the city  as partners in a
move to  improve the  civic  services. Waste management was  used as an
entry point to tap the energies of these organisations and to stimulate them
to experiment with  new ways to  solve the city's  problems. This  initiative
has resulted in the creation of a forum called "Swabhimana"  (self esteem),
an informal network of city officials and non-governmental groups who get
together periodically and work out answers to priority problems. This forum
not only experiments with  new approaches to  solving  problems, but also
disseminates information  widely  and  performs a  watchdog  function.  The
network  has expanded with  more and more residents' associations linking
up  with  the  core  group.  PAC is  a  member of  this  group  and  plays  a
coordinating role as required.
15More recently, BCC  has turned to PAC for new ideas to improve the agency-
citizen interface.  As  a  result,  proposals are  now  under consideration to
reform the  property tax  administration and the  approval of  building plans,
both  of  whiclh are  well  known  for  corrupt  practices and  harassment of
citizens. BCC has recently introduced a new grievance redressal system for
which PAC's assistance has been sought. A new training and orientation for
the concerned officials has been carried out by PAC. Thus BCC has sought
to stimulate gireater  citizen participation in its services, simplify its services
and make them more citizen friendly, and respond to public complaints in a
more efficient and transparent manner. The report card acted as a trigger for
these initiatives  and PAC has been actively  involved  in their  design and
implementationr.
Bangalore's  public  hospitals  provide  another  example  of  an  interesting
response to PAC's special report card on the subject. This report card was
an  offshoot  of  the  general report  card  on  the  city's  services. The  two
leading public hospitals of the city were extremely poorly rated in the report
card  in comparison to  both  non-profit and for  profit  hospitals. Both  poor
service delivery and corruption were highlighted in the findings. The media
was active  in the dissemination of the  study findings.  In response, these
two  hospitals organised a day long meeting in collaboration with  PAC and a
few  other  NGOs in the city  to  discuss ways  and means to  improve their
services. After  this  lively meeting, the hospitals have agreed to join with  a
voluntary  group to  set  up  "help  desks"  to  assist patients and to  reorient
their  staff  to  be  more  responsive and  efficient.  This  is  a  very  recent
development, but the decisions taken at the meeting look promising.
Second Round Developments
PAC's work with the citizen groups and media in Bangalore  have resulted in
several other  initiatives  that  have a  bearing on  corruption.  All  these are
examples of how civil society institutions can demand greater transparency
in public affairs and initiate collective action  in support of this  goal when
they  are strengthened in terms of knowledge and motivation. We highlight
below three such cases.
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Residents' associations in eight wards of the city  played an innovative role
in  the  civic  elections  of  Bangalore  in  1996  through  a  campaign  to
disseminate information about the candidates who had entered the fray. The
objective  was  to  gather  and  disseminate  pertinent  information  about
candidates that citizens needed  to know before they cast their votes. It was
a common practice among political parties to  project the  party image and
reveal very  little about their candidates. The campaign was an attempt to
turn  this  around  by  asking  candidates  to  reveal  their  background,
qualifications and experience. They were asked to  sign statements giving
personal responses  to a variety of questions. They were asked, for example,
whether  they  pay  income tax  and  whether  they  had  any  corruption  or
criminal  charges  against  them.  Their  credentials  in  terms  of  past
accomplishments and future  priorities were explored. This  information was
put together in a comparative format and disseminated to the voters  in the
wards  just  before the  voting  day.  It  was  reported that  some  candidates
withdrew  from  the  contest  as  a  result  of  the  campaign. Whether  this
experiment  made any  difference  to  the  choices  made by  the  voters  is
difficult  to  say. But  it  showed the  people how  information on  candidates
could be generated through collective action and how the process could be
used to demand greater transparency in public life. The campaign signalled
to  the political parties and candidates that  people care about the quality of
candidates and that corruption and other abuses were matters of concern to
them.
Case 2
In  recent  months,  the  municipal commissioner of  Bangalore mounted  a
campaign to demolish illegally constructed buildings in the city.  In one area,
an  illegal  structure  erected  by  a  temple  was  also  pulled  down.  The
supporters  of  the  temple  protested  this  action,  and  got  a  few  political
leaders, including the  Mayor,  to  support  their  stand.  It  looked as  if  the
commissioner who  upheld the  law  was  at  fault  and  could  be  overruled.
Surprisingly, within  a  short  time,  there  was  a  public outcry  against the
Mayor's  statements, followed  by  a  spate of  letters  and  editorials  in the
press supporting the commissioner's action. The campaign was led by the
residents'  associations  and  NGOs who  had  worked  with  PAC  on  the
followup of the report card and the election campaign. Soon political leaders
at the highest level rebuked the Mayor and other leaders who  had opposed
the  commissioner's action.  The demolition  of  illegal structures  was  thus
upheld.
17Both these cases show how the civil  society can play an effective  role in
challenging corrupt practices and other abuses of public power provided its
members are  organised and  motivated  to  demand public  accountability.
Report cards acted as seeds that caused the initiation of collective action in
support of good governance. Each experiment enables the groups to  learn
and gain strength to tackle the new problems  they encounter.
Media Follow  up of Report  Cards
Yet  another  example of  a  second round  development is  what  a  major
newspaper the  Times of India did  with  PAC's  report  card  on  hospitals.
Armed  with  the  information  provided  by  the  report  card,  the  reporter
concerned went to the public hospitals, and interviewed senior officials and
doctors to get their side of the story. She then went on to talk to patients to
get a confirmation on the report card findings. Her report on the subject in
the newspaper was on the front page and generated a public debate on the
subject that went on for several days. The message  was loud and clear that
the abuses and extortion being practised in the city's  public hospitals should
not  be tolerated.  Within a few  weeks, some nurses in one of  the  public
hospitals weire arrested on charges of corruption and negligence in a child
delivery case.
This shows how innovative journalists can build on the report card findings
and assembles  further  information on the problems of  corruption and poor
service  delivery.  In  India,  examples of  this  kind  are  still  few  and  far
between.  Nevertheless,  the  potential  for  such  follow  up  work  is
considerable.  Its  payoff  in  terms  of  creating  public  awareness  and
stimulating public officials to act in the present case was significant.
Il
Is Bangalore  Changing?
It is difficult  to measure the impact of the various developments described
above on citizens' awareness and on the  behaviour of  service providers in
Bangalore. For  one  thing,  neither  the  report  card  nor  the  subsequent
interventions can be regarded as major or continuing events in a large city.
Corrupt practices and non-responsive services have complex and multiple
causes and  cannot  be  reformed overnight.  Similarly,  not  all  people or
organisations are equally affected by and hence concerned about the issues
involved. Pubilic  awareness and agency actions will  no doubt be influenced
also by many other factors such as policy changes and other governmental
18actions. To unscramble  the joint effects of these diverse developments is by
no means  an easy task.
On the other  hand, a  period of  about  three years  has elapsed since the
report card on Bangalore  was completed. It is not premature  to ask whether
people feel  that  their  awareness of  the  problems of  civic  services  and
remedies has improved. It is equally pertinent to ascertain whether they feel
that public agencies  are beginning to respond to the new demands. At least,
answers to these questions might show whether changes are occurring in
the right direction.
We  present  below  the  results of  a  modest  survey  of  citizens,  agency
officials  and  media  staff  (editors,  reporters,  etc.)  that  attempted  an
assessment of their views and perceptions of the changes taking  place in
the city  and its services. A judgmental sample of  100 persons drawn from
citizen groups, officials and the media was prepared  of whom 74 responded
through personal interviews. The sample is admittedly small and does not
claim  statistical  reliability.  Nevertheless, the  results  may  provide  useful
pointers to the directional changes in the city in the post-report card period.
Survey on impact of NGO/  Citizen Groups on Quality of Public Services
- 93  percent of  the  respondents agree that  citizen  awareness of  the
problems concerning public services in Bangalore has increased in the
last three years
- 89  percent of  the  respondents say  there  are  more citizen  /  resident
Groups active in Bangalore  than three years ago.
- 83  percent  of  the  respondents state  that  they  are  personally  more
actively  involved in the issues of  public service quality than they  were
three years ago
,  54  percent of the  respondents feel that  the  public agencies are  more
responsive  to citizen problems than three years ago
*  89 percent of the respondents feel that  newspapers are reporting more
on local governance issues than three years ago
*  69  percent  of  the  respondents feel  public  pressure  has  resulted  in
improved services
*  68 percent of the  respondents say that,  as a result of  public pressure,
willingness to  channe in public agencies is  more  than  it  used to  be
earlier,
*  29  percent of  the  respondents feel that  corruption  has declined as  a
result of public pressure  while 46 percent feel it has not declined, and 25
percent are unsure.
*  47  percent of the  respondents feel that  the  behaviour of the  staff  in
public agencies has improved as a result of public pressure
19*  49  percent of the respondents  say public pressure has lead to increased
sharing of information by public agencies
*  79  percent of the  respondents acknowledge the  role of  NGOs/resident
groups in creating greater confidence among the people in their ability to
bring about improvement in public services in their neighbourhood.
The findings reported above provide some evidence on the kinds of changes
currently being experienced by a cross section of people in Bangalore.  There
is a clear and consistent pattern of positive changes in terms of increased
public awareness, more active media role in the dissemination of information
and greater responsiveness  on the part of the public service providers. Only
a  minority  of the  respondents, however,  feel that  corruption is  declining.
This  is  not  altogether surprising as  corruption  is  a  function  of  multiple
causes some of which are deep rooted and long term in nature.
It is useful to supplement  this evidence with a sampling of the recent views
expressed by the  leaders of the  major public agencies in Bangalore. Their
statements,  quoted below,  reflect the  concerns of  the  leaders about  the
issues under discussion in this paper. To the extent there is a convergence
of views on the need for change and for involving civil society in improving
services and accountability, their proposals  and assessments  of the situation
could be seen as reinforcing the findings of the sample survey of citizens
reported above. These statements can be regarded as a  response to  the
report card as well as the subsequent developments described in this paper.
The quotatioins reproduced below are from the  interviews  press reporters
have had with the agency leaders in recent months.
Laxmi  Venkatachalam,  Commissioner, Bangalore Development  Authority
says: Under the Swabhimana Movement, interactions with  citizens' groups
has been stepped up by the creation of ward offices in some of the layouts.
We  encourage residents' associations to  meet us  frequently and  discuss
their needs .......  To facilitate quick redressal  of grievances, senior officials
have been asked to meet the public ......  More than this, we  want timely
feedback from residents to help in the groundwork and monitor the work of
officials,  especially the  contractors  ...........  BDA  has  also  initiated  an
organisational development programme with  the  assistance of  the  Public
Affairs Centre."
Vijay  Gore,  Chairman,  Karnataka  Electricity  Board  says:  X  We  need
residents' associations to  participate in the  maintenance of  street  lights,
which  though  a  BCC responsibility,  is  done  partly  by  us.  Our  second
proposal is for the associations to take up the bill book, help in collection
and also prune trees that  obstruct cables. The city  is growing beyond our
reach; so we would like any organisation to come forward and help us."
20J.P. Sharma, Chairman, Bangalore  Water and Sanitation Board says:  "  The
associations are  our watchdogs  who  can trace  unauthorised connections
and take  up counselling. They can help us  with  meter reading and cash
collection ....  They can watch  over our  officials.  We  are going to  have
division-wise meetings with residents to create interaction."
Conclusions
1.  Experiments with  report cards  in  Bangalore confirm  the  value of  this
public  feedback  mechanism  both  to  enable  citizens  to  signal  service
providers about their performance and to stimulate the latter to respond to
these signals. As noted above, response to the feedback is a function  of
complex and varied factors.  It  is  not easy, therefore,  to  predict whether
responses  will occur and whether they will be in the right direction. In some
cases, negative or defensive reactions may be triggered by  a report card.
The Bangalore experience, however, is that  public agencies are capable of
responding positively to the stimulus of the report card. This has been borne
out  by the  response to  our  citywide  report card as well  as to  the  report
cards  on  specialized agencies. Needless to  say, the  response cannot  be
attributed solely to the publicity given to the report card, but also to other
facilitating actions taken alongside. It could also be that the novelty of the
method and its ability to  put agencies on the spot triggered these positive
responses.
2. Both the report card and the subsequent developments seem to have had
a positive impact on the citizens' awareness of Bangalore's  public service
problems.  The media have played a part in this which citizens seem to
recognise. There is some evidence  that  public agencies  are beginning to be
more responsive  compared to the pre-report card days. The time taken by
the agencies  to digest the feedback and respond is admittedly long (one to
two years). Frequent  changes in agency leadership is a problem that
exacerbates  this tendency. Part of the answer to this problem lies in the
much needed reform of personnel  policies in government. Changes  of this
kind cannot be neatly programmed  as they call for systemic reforms as well
as new attitudes. This applies in particular to the control of corruption which
tends to be a long term process.
3.  A  unique feature of  the  report card  is the  way  in which  it  focusses
attention  on corruption,  a phenomenon that  has always  been difficult  to
pinpoint  and  quantify.  The collusive nature of  corruption  in  many  cases
makes it  difficult  for  outsiders to  estimate  its  magnitude  and  severity.
Getting the  givers of  bribes to  identify  the  agencies involved achieves a
21measure  of  specificity  and  credibility.  Comparison  between  agencies,
locations, etc., attracts public attention and puts an unwelcome spotlight on
the agencies. In general, those who head these public agencies  are anxious
to avoid such publicity. The report card on corruption gives organised  citizen
groups the kind of information they need to seek reform in specific agencies
and to demand greater public accountability.
4. One of the lessons from Bangalore  is that service delivery and corruption
are  closely  interlinked.  Inefficient  and  cumbersome  services  create
opportunities  for  corruption.  Non-transparent procedures  and  arbitrary
decisions force  people to  collude with  corrupt  officials  or  to  succumb to
extortion.  The  strategy for  corruption control  should therefore  start  with
measures to  improve service delivery.  Increased access to  information on
services,  specification  of  standards  of  services  and  customers'  rights,
appeal mechanisms, etc.,  are steps that  can go a long way to  reduce the
opportunities and incentives to engage in corrupt practices. When it comes
to  "M grand  corruption",  reform  of  service  delivery  alone  may  not  be
adequate. But even here, greater transparency, access to  information and
appeal  mechanisms will  no  doubt  enable the  more  honest  players to
withstand pressures  from the corrupt.
5. The experience with  report cards  in Bangalore as well  as other  cities
reinforces the  case for  institutionalising  periodic surveys  of  the  users of
public  services as  a  source of  feedback on  the  performance of  service
providers. The use of public feedback can act as a proxy for the pressure of
competition  in a context where customers have few  choices. Most public
service providers and regulators are monopolies and the scope for  making
them  compete in  the  market  place is  rather limited  in  many  developing
countries.  External research and advocacy groups could demonstrate the
use of public feedback as a means  to stimulate public service agencies  to be
more responsive to their customers. In the final analysis, service providers
as well as their supervising authorities should see merit in this approach and
commission user surveys on a periodic basis.
Report cards should not be viewed as a one time exercise. A report card on
public services or on a specific agency could be repeated  every year or after
a longer period depending upon the urgency of problems and the resources
available to conduct surveys. Report  cards across cities are also useful,
especially when there is interest in comparing the performance of a city or
of specific services with that of others. For the sake of credibility and to
stimulate increased  public awareness and action, it will be best if the
initiative is taken by local non-governmental  bodies. Local newspapers can
often be useful allies in this endeavour. Since the design of the survey and
data collection and analysis need to be done professionally, it is desirable to
involve market research or survey firms in the country in the design and
22conduct of the field work. Local foundations and enterprises (or
associations) are promising sources of funding to meet the costs of the
surveys. An important reason why non-governmental  groups should take the
lead is because  they could play a continuing and catalytic role in initiating
followup activities such as interacting with the public agencies  and
instigating change through civil society action.
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